In order to understand the formation of social conventions we need to know the specific role of control and learning in multi-agent systems. To advance in this direction, we propose, within the framework of the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) theory, a novel Control-based Reinforcement Learning architecture (CRL) that can account for the acquisition of social conventions in multi-agent populations that are solving a benchmark social decision-making problem. Our new CRL architecture, as a concrete realization of DAC multi-agent theory, implements a low-level sensorimotor control loop handling the agent's reactive behaviors (pre-wired reflexes), along with a layer based on model-free reinforcement learning that maximizes long-term reward. We apply CRL in a multi-agent game-theoretic task in which coordination must be achieved in order to find an optimal solution. We show that our CRL architecture is able to both find optimal solutions in discrete and continuous time and reproduce human experimental data on standard game-theoretic metrics such as efficiency in acquiring rewards, fairness in reward distribution and stability of convention formation.
I. Introduction The formation of social conventions
In his seminal work "Convention" 1 , David Lewis defines social conventions as regularities in action that emerge to solve coordination problems and possess two main characteristics: conventions are self-sustaining and arbitrary. Self-sustaining, in the sense that a group of agents in a given population will continue to conform to it as long as they expect the others to do so; and arbitrary, because there are other equally acceptable possibilities to solve the same coordination problem.
Understanding under which conditions these conventions can be formed and how, is still an open question, traditionally studied in cooperation games under the umbrella of Game Theory studies 2 , and later within Evolutionary Game Theory [3] [4] [5] .
The most iconic example of Game Theory is the Prisoner's Dilemma. The game proposes a situation in which two arrested criminals have to decide, without communication, whether to testify against the other (defect) or to remain silent (cooperate). If both cooperate, they will spend just 1 year in jail. If both defect, they will spend 6 years. If one cooperates and the other defects, the former will spend 10 years in jail while the latter will be freed. In game theory, the combination of possible actions and its subsequent rewards it's represented by a payoff matrix like the one shown in Figure 1 .
One key concept on game theory is the so-called Nash Equilibrium 6 , that is a set of strategies in which no player has the interest to change unilaterally her or his own strategy.
In the case of the classical Prisoner's Dilemma, and if the game is only played once, the only Nash Equilibrium is mutual defection, because 'defect' will always render a higher payoff, regardless of what the other player chooses. There is a particularly interesting version of this game called Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), thoroughly studied by Robert Axelrod, that consists in playing several consecutive rounds of the game. If one player chooses to 'defect' in a given round, the other player has the chance to retaliate in the next round by 'defecting' back. In this case, if the number of rounds is random or unknown to the players, 'mutual defection' is no longer the only Nash Equilibrium, because the incentive to defect is countered by the fear of retaliation, thus, leading to the emergence of cooperation as a Nash Equilibrium. As proven by
Axelrod's seminal work 7 , the IPD shows that cooperation can emerge out of repeated interactions by pure natural selection. Following Axelrod's findings, Russell Hardin postulated that social conventions could be originated in large populations through the same type of repeated dyadic interactions due to the capacity of each individual to generalize to similar cases and the overlapping nature of group activities 8 .
However, although the classical game theoretic approach remained hegemonic for more than three decades in studying how humans and other animals cooperate 9, 10 , flaws in this approach led to alternate models 11, 12 . One of the major concerns was related to the ecological validity of the experiments based on the IPD, arguing that the conditions under which these experiments are conducted are hardly (if ever) found in nature 9, 11, 13 .
Particularly, many studies pointed to the fact that cooperation between animals (humans and non-humans) usually requires a continuous exchange of information in order to emerge, a feature that the IPD and other similar cooperation games lack, precisely because they are based on discrete-time turns that impose a significant delay between actions [13] [14] [15] .
In order to tackle this issue, several investigations have devised ways to modify standard game theory discrete-time tasks into dynamic versions where individuals can respond to each other's actions in continuous-time [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Their results point out that cooperation can be more easily achieved in the dynamic version of the task due to the rapid flow of information between individuals and their capacity to react in continuous-time 20, 22 .
One example of this can be found in 23 , where Hawkins and Goldstone show that continuous-time interaction helps to converge to more stable strategies in a game theoretical task compared to the same task modeled in discrete-time. They also show that the involved payoffs affect the formation of social conventions. According to these results, they suggest that real-life coordination problems can be solved either by convention or through spontaneous coordination and that these solutions depend on what is at stake if the coordination fails. To illustrate this point, they make the comparison between two real-life examples of a coordination problem: On one hand, when we drive a car, the stakes are high because if we fail to coordinate the outcome could be fatal, so we resort to a convention -e.g. to drive on the right side of the road. On the other hand, when we try to avoid people on a crowded street, we do it "on the fly" because the stakes are low, so it's not risky to rely on purely reactive behaviors (e.g. avoidance behavior) to solve it.
In this paper, we propose a computational model of cognitive agents involved in a social decision-making task called The Battle of the Exes and we confront our results to human data obtained in 23 . For this purpose, we develop a Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) cognitive architecture based on the principles of the Distributed Adaptive Control multi-agent theory (DACma). Our architecture integrates both a low-level reactive control loop to manage within-round conflicts, and a policy learning algorithm to acquire across-round strategies. We run simulations showing that the modeled cognitive agents rely more on across-round policy learning when the stakes of the game are higher and that reactive control helps to acquire better outcomes in terms of efficiency and fairness.
This provides a computational hypothesis explaining key aspects of the emergence of social conventions (e.g. turn-taking or pure dominance) in game-theoretic setups and provides new experimental predictions to be tested in human coordination tasks.
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Regarding the computational modeling of game-theoretical tasks, there is already extensive literature where the study of the emergence of conflict and cooperation in agent populations has been tackled, especially through the use of multi-agent reinforcement learning (for extensive reviews, check [24] [25] [26] ).
In this direction, a lot of focus has been put recently on developing enhanced versions of the Deep Q-Learning Network architecture proposed in 27 , particularly on their extensions to the social domain [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . This architecture uses a reinforcement learning algorithm that extracts abstract features from raw pixels through a deep convolutional network. Along those lines, some researchers [28] [29] [30] are modeling the type of conflicts represented in the classic game-theoretic tasks (e.g. the IPD) into more ecologically valid environments 28 where agent learning is based on deep Q-networks 29, 30 . For instance, agents based on this cognitive model are already capable or learning how to play a two-player video game such as Pong from raw sensory data and achieve human-level performance 27 , both in cooperative and competitive modes 31 . Other approaches are paying more attention to how to develop agents that achieve good outcomes in general-sum games and complex social dilemmas, by focusing on maintaining cooperation 32 , by making an agent prosocial (taking into account other's rewards) 33 or by conditioning its behavior solely on its outcomes 34 .
While the computational approaches described above are able to reproduce some of the key aspects of the formation of social behaviors in agent populations, they are not suited for disentangling the role of reactive control and policy learning in this process. Even when the coordination task is being modeled in real-time and the agents are biologically and environmentally constrained, these approaches are not considering lower-level sensorimotor control loops bootstrapping learning in higher levels of the cognitive architecture.
In contrast, the Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) architecture we propose is based on the Distributed Adaptive Control multi-agent (DACma) 35, 36 
A. The Distributed Adaptive Control theory
DAC is a theory of brain and mind that proposes that cognition is based on four control layers that operate at different levels of abstraction 35, 36, 38 .
The first level, the Soma layer, contains the whole body of the agent with all the sensors and actuators and represents the interface between the agent and its environment. This layer also contains the physiological needs of the agent, which are the driving force of the whole system. In the Reactive layer, those physiological needs are satisfied through the self-regulation of internal drives, implemented as reactive sensorimotor loops for maintaining them stable (in homeostasis). These reactive interactions bootstrap the learning of instantaneous policies implemented in the Adaptive layer for acquiring a statespace of the agent-environment interaction. Outside the scope of this paper, the Contextual layer acquires temporally extended policies that contribute to the acquisition of more abstract cognitive abilities such as goal selection, memory and planning 36 . These higher-level representations, in turn, affect the behavior of the lower layers in a top-down fashion. Control in this architecture is therefore distributed between all layers thanks to the interactions in both directions, top-down and bottom-up, as well as laterally within each layer.
DAC makes explicit the distinction between real-time control on one hand (Reactive layer) and perceptual and behavioral learning on the other hand. It is, therefore, an adequate theoretical framework for understanding the specific roles of reactive control and policy learning in the formation of social conventions, which is the aim of the present paper. This allows the identification of the functions the agents will need in both the ballistic and the dynamic conditions of the Battle of the Exes. On one hand, in the ballistic condition, where the players can only make a decision at the beginning of each round, the cognitive agents will only need to use the adaptive layer for solving the task. On the other hand, in the dynamic condition, the agents will need both the reactive and the adaptive layer, since they will be moving through the environment, sensing and acting in continuous-time, and not only making abstract discrete decisions.
In section II, we describe in detail the novel Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) architecture, composed of both a reactive and an adaptive control layer. This results in a hybrid control-learning model where reinforcement learning interacts with a feedback controller by inhibiting specific reactive behaviors. (low reward). If both go to the great coffee shop they will come across into each other and will not enjoy the break at all. So basically, if they want to enjoy their coffee break, they will have to coordinate in a way that they avoid each other every day. This situation can be modeled within the framework of game theory with a payoff relation such as a > b > 0; where a is the payoff for getting the great coffee, b the payoff of the okay coffee and 0 the payoff for both players if they go to the same location.
B. Benchmark
Regarding the stakes of the interaction, the payoff matrix is manipulated to create two different conditions: high, where the difference between payoffs is higher; and low, where the difference is lower. The payoff matrices in Figure 2 illustrate these two conditions. As for the continuity of the interaction, the experiment has a ballistic and a dynamic condition. In the ballistic condition, as in classical game theory, the players can only choose an action at the beginning of every round of the game, without any further control on the outcome. However, in the dynamic condition, the players can freely change the course of their avatars until one of them reaches a reward (for a visual example of the difference between conditions, check the original videos here). In both conditions, the round ends when one of the players reaches one of the reward spots that represent the coffee shops. Altogether, this results in four conditions in total, two for the stakes of the interaction (high vs. low) combined with two for the continuity of the interaction (ballistic vs. dynamic).
For the experiment, they pair the human players in dyads that depending on the payoff condition, play 50 (high) or 60 (low) consecutive rounds together. In order to analyze the coordination between the players of each dyad, they use three measures -efficiency, fairness, and stability-based on Binmore's three levels of priority 40 :
• Efficiency -It measures the cumulative sum of rewards that players were able to earn collectively in each round, divided by the total amount of possible rewards.
If the efficiency value is 1, it means that the players got the maximum amount of reward.
• Fairness -It quantifies the balance between the earnings of the two players. If the fairness value is 1, it means that both players earned the higher payoff the same amount of times.
• Stability -It measures how well the strategy is maintained over time. In other words, it quantifies how predictable are the outcomes of the following rounds based on previous results by "using the information-theoretic measure of surprisal, which Shannon defined as the negative logarithm of the probability of an event" 23 .
The results show that players in the dynamic condition achieve greater efficiency and fairness than their counterparts in the ballistic condition, both in the high payoff and low payoff setups (see Figure 3 ). However, their key finding is that in the dynamic condition, the players coordinate more "on the fly" (i.e. without the need of a long-term strategy) when the payoff is low, but when the payoff is high, the participants coordinate into more stable strategies. In other words, they identified the stakes of the interaction as a crucial factor in the formation of social conventions when the interaction happens in real-time.
The present paper attempts at replicating the results we have just described with a computational model based on an integrated cognitive architecture, in order to identify what are the specific roles of reactive control and policy learning in the emergence of social conventions. 
II. Methods Model
The CRL architecture we propose in this study is a model-free approach to reinforcement learning, but with the addition of a reactive controller (for a model-based approach, see 41 ). The CRL is composed of two layers, a Reactive and an Adaptive layer. The former governs the sensorimotor contingencies of the agent within the rounds of the game, whereas the latter is in charge of learning across rounds.
A. Reactive Layer
The Reactive Layer (RL) represents the agent sensorimotor control system and is supposed to be prewired (typically from evolutionary processes in a biological perspective). In the Battle of the Exes game that we are considering here, we equip the agents with two predefined reactive behaviors 'orienting towards rewards' and 'escape from agents'. This means that, even in the absence of any learning process, the agents are intrinsically attracted to the reward spots and repulsed from each other. This intrinsic dynamic will bootstrap learning in the Adaptive Layer, as we will see.
To model this layer, we follow an approach inspired by Valentino Braitenberg's Vehicles • The 'orienting towards rewards' behavior is made by a combination of a crossed excitatory connection and a direct inhibitory connection between the reward spot sensors ( ) and the motors (m), plus a forward speed constant value f set to 0.3:
where is the sensor positioned on the left side of the robot indicating the proximity of a reward spot, and is either the high (H) or the low reward (L)
sensor (see Figure 4 , C and D). The sensors perceive the proximity of the spot.
The closer the reward spots, the higher the sensors will be activated.
Therefore, if no reward spot is detected ( = ℎ = 0), the robot will go forward at speed f. Otherwise, the most activated sensor (left or right) will make the robot turn in the direction of the corresponding reward spot.
• The 'escape from agents' behavior is made by the opposite combination: a direct excitatory connection and a crossed inhibitory connection, but in this case between the agent sensors ( ) and the motors (m):
where is the sensor positioned on the left side of the robot indicating the proximity of the other agent (see Figure 4B) . The closer the reward spots, the higher the sensors will be activated.
In this case as well, if no agent is detected ( = ℎ = 0), the robot will go forward at the speed f. Otherwise, the most activated sensor will make the robot turn in the opposite direction of the other agent, thus avoiding it.
B. Adaptive Layer
The agent's Adaptive layer (AL) is based on a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm that endows the agent with learning capacities for maximizing long-term reward. Functionally, it decides the agent's action at the beginning of the round, based on the state of the previous round and its policy. The possible states are three: 'high', 'low' and 'tie'; and indicate the outcome of the previous round for each agent. That is, if an agent got the high reward on the previous round, the state is 'high'; if it got the low reward, the state is 'low'; and if both agents went to the same reward, the state is 'tie'.
The actions are three as well: 'go to the high', 'go to the low' and 'none'.
In the ballistic condition, in which the agents only use this layer to operate, the two first actions will take the agent directly to the respective reward spots (high and low), while the 'none' action will choose randomly between them. In each round, the action chosen by the AL is sampled according to ( = | = ), where s is the actual state observed by the agent. 
Figure 5: Representation of the complete cognitive architecture of the agent. On top the Adaptive layer (reinforcement learning control loop) composed of a Critic or value function (V), an Actor or action policy (P) and an inhibitor function (i)
.
m (corresponding to the left and right motors). The action selected by the AL is passed through the inhibitor function that will turn off one of the attraction behaviors of the RL depending on the action selected. If the action is 'go to the high', the 'orienting towards low reward' reactive behavior will be inhibited. If the AL selects 'go to the low', the RL will inhibit its 'orienting towards high reward' behavior. If the AL selects 'none', the RL will act normally without any inhibition.
In the dynamic condition, the agent uses the whole architecture, with the Adaptive and the Reactive layer working together (see Figure 5 ). As in the previous condition, the agent's AL chooses an action at the beginning of the round, based on the state of the previous round and its policy. This action is then signaled to the RL, that will inhibit the opposite reward-attraction reactive behavior according to the action selected by the AL.
In the case that the AL chooses the action 'go to the high', the RL will inhibit the 'orienting towards low reward' behavior, allowing the agent to focus only on the high reward. Conversely, if the AL chooses the action 'go to the low', the reactive attraction to the high reward will be inhibited. In both cases, the 'agent avoidance' reactive behavior still operates. Finally, if the action 'none' is selected, instead of choosing randomly between the other two actions as in the ballistic condition, the AL will not act at all, thus relying completely on the behaviors of the RL to play that round of the game.
The Adaptive Layer is implemented as a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm for maximizing accumulated reward over rounds through action, similar to the one implemented in 43 (see Figure 6 ) and adapted to operate on discrete state and action spaces.
Figure 6: Representation of the TD-learning algorithm implementing the Adaptive layer. At each time step, the Critic (or value function, V) receives the state of the environment and the current reward as an input and outputs a TD error (e) signal informing the agent whether its last action has performed better or worse than expected (see details below). This signal is sent to the Actor (or action policy, P) and back to the Critic. The Actor uses the TD error to update its policy in order to converge to the optimal action for each state, while the Critic uses it to update the value function.
More specifically, we use an Actor-Critic Temporal Difference Learning algorithm (TDlearning), which is based on the interaction between two main components:
• an Actor, or action policy π, which learns the mapping from states (s ϵ S) to actions where γ is a discount factor that is empirically set to 0.40.
When e(s) > 0 (resp. e(s) < 0), this means that the action performed better (resp. worse) than expected. The TD error signal is then sent both to the Actor and back to the Critic for updating their current values. 
where k is the number of possible actions.
Laplace's Law of Succession is a generalized histogram (frequency count) where it is assumed that each value has already been observed once prior to any actual observation.
By doing so it prevents null probabilities (when no data has been observed, it returns a uniform probability distribution). Therefore, the higher (a , s ), the more probable a will be executed in s .
Using these equations, actions performing better than expected (e(s) > 0) will increase their probability to be chosen the next time the agent will be in state s −1 . When e(s) < 0, the probability will decrease.
Finally, the Critic (value function) is updated following,
where is a learning rate that is set to 0.15.
Experimental Setup
We follow, as in the Battle of the Exes benchmark 23 , a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design. One dimension represents the ballistic and dynamic versions of the game, whereas the other dimension is composed of the high and low difference between payoffs. The rules of the game are as follows: A round of the game finishes when one of the agents reaches a reward spot. If both agents are within the white circle area when this happens, it's considered a tie, and both get 0 points. The small spot always gives a reward of 1, whereas the big spot gives 2 or 4 depending on the payoff condition (low or high respectively, see Figure 2 ). The reward spots are allocated randomly between the two positions at the beginning of each round.
III. Results
We report the main results of our experiment in relation to human performance in the Battle of the Exes task 22 , which are analyzed using: efficiency, fairness, and stability 40 .
For each of these measures, we report the results of the model and plot them in contrast with the human data from 22 . Then, we interpret those results and after that, we analyze the role of each layer of the CRL architecture in relation to the data obtained in each condition.
Efficiency
The efficiency scores of the model followed a normal distribution in the four conditions, so first, a one-way ANOVA was performed, showing a statistically significant difference between groups (F (3, 46) = 755, p < .001). Post-hoc independent samples t-tests showed that dynamic (high and low) conditions, (M = 0.88, M = 0.86), are as well significantly more efficient than their ballistic counterparts (M = 0.46, M = 0.45); between both high (t (98) = -33, p < .001) and low conditions (t (98) = -33, p < .001). We can observe the same statistical tendencies than in the human benchmark data (see Figure 8 ). 
Fairness
As for the fairness scores of the model, a one-way ANOVA showed a statistically significant difference between groups (F (3, 46) = 6.88, p < .001). Post-hoc independent samples t-tests showed that, as in the benchmark, the high ballistic condition (M = 0.50)
is significantly less fair than the two dynamic conditions, high (t (98) = -3.73, p < .001) and low (t (98) = -3.99, p < .001), both with a mean fairness score of 0.68. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference between the low ballistic condition (M = 0.61) and the low dynamic (p = .086), but, as opposed to the human results, the low and high ballistic conditions of the model are significantly different (t (98) = -2.17, p < .05).
Again, the same statistical tendencies are observed in humans and model (see Figure 9 ). The remarkable increase in efficiency in the dynamic condition is due to the Reactive layer key role in avoiding within-round conflict when both agents have chosen to go to the same reward, a feature that a ballistic model of the game cannot achieve.
As for the results in stability, the model was overall less stable than the benchmark, although it reflected a similar relation between conditions: no difference between high and low payoff conditions in the ballistic setup, and an increase in stability in the high dynamic condition compared to the low dynamic (see Figure 10) . Nonetheless, our results show the formation of social conventions such as turn-taking and dominance, as shown in Figure 11 . The examples shown in the figure illustrate how two conventions were formed in the dynamic high condition, where this type of equilibria ocurred more often and during more rounds than in the other three conditions, thus explaining the higher stability in this condition.
To conclude, besides the mentioned differences between the human benchmark and the model, our results are consistent with human data in that dynamic, continuous-time interaction helps to converge to more efficient, fair and stable strategies when the stakes are high. 
Reliance on the Adaptive layer
In order to identify the specific role of each layer in the formation of the social conventions, we run an analysis that estimates their participation (through the introduction of the "none" action) as a function of the payoff difference. Based on the results of benchmark and model in the dynamic condition, where higher payoff differences help to achieve higher stability, we expect that the more we increase this difference between payoffs, the more the agents will rely on the Adaptive layer.
For testing this prediction, we performed a simulation with six different conditions with varying levels of payoff difference (high vs. low reward value), from 1-1 to 32-1. To measure the level of reliance on each layer, we logged the number of times each agent outputted a 'none' action, that is the action in which the agent relies completely on the Reactive layer to solve the round. Considering that there are only 3 possible actions, if the Adaptive layer was randomly choosing the actions, we should observe that the agent selects each action the same amount of times (i.e. prior to any learning, when the action policy returns uniform distributions over A). That means that, at the beginning of each dyad, the reliance on the Reactive layer would be 33% and the reliance on the Adaptive layer 66%. Starting from this point, if our hypothesis is correct, we will expect to observe an increase in the reliance of the Adaptive layer as the payoff difference increases. Indeed, the results show, as seen in Figure 12 , that there is a steady increase in the percentage of selection of the adaptive layer as the payoff difference augments.
IV. Discussion
In this paper, we have investigated the specific role that real-time control and learning have on the formation of social conventions in multi-agent setups. We have proposed, based on the principles of DAC, a novel Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) cognitive architecture. The CRL is a model-free approach to reinforcement learning, but with the addition of a reactive controller. Our CRL architecture is composed of a module based on an actor-critic TD learning algorithm that endows the agent with learning capacities for maximizing long-term reward, and a low-level sensorimotor control loop handling the agent's reactive behaviors. This integrated cognitive architecture is applied to a multi-agent game-theoretic task, the Battle of the Exes, in which coordination between two agents can be achieved. We have shown that our model is able to converge to both turn-taking and pure dominance equilibria. Moreover, we have demonstrated that real-time agent interaction does affect the formation of more stable, fair and effective social coventions when compared to the same task modeled in discrete-time. These results are consistent with the ones Hawkins and Goldstone obtained with human subjects in 23 .
In addition, we can interpret our results in the context of a functional cognitive model, the CRL, in which we can determine the specific role that reactive and adaptive control loops play in the formation of social conventions and of spontaneous coordination. In that sense, we can assess that the Reactive layer has a significant role in avoiding within-round conflict (spontaneous coordination), while the Adaptive layer is required to achieve across-round coordination (social conventions). In addition, the model supports our hypothesis that higher payoff differences will increase the reliance on the Adaptive layer.
To our knowledge, this is the first model that is able to reproduce human behavioral data in a social decision-making game that was presented both in discrete-time and continuous-time setups. Furthermore, similar experiments don't take into account the role that sensorimotor control loops have in solving the modeled problems in real life scenarios, an issue that we do consider in our study and constitutes a fundamental requirement for the development of a fully embodied AI.
Moreover, as a result of this work, we can now further study how specific manipulations of the experimental conditions (like increasing the differences between payoffs, as presented in Figure 12 ) can affect both the outcome of the task and the implication of both control loops in solving it. These results allow us to make
predictions that can later be tested in human experiments.
For future work, there are several directions in which we can continue to develop the work presented in this paper. One possibility would be to focus on a more biologically detailed approach. We could implement a Reactive layer that would be also more consistent with the DAC theory by taking inspiration in the work done in 45 , where a reactive controller model is presented that also regulates the agent's internal needs. In this direction, we could also implement a Contextual layer like the one presented in 46, 47 that allows the agent the learning of rules to maximize delayed reward. Such models allow to build causal models of the world and to take into account context in the learning of optimal action policies. Extending our agent with such functionalities could allow solving much more complicated social coordination problems with delayed reward.
Another interesting avenue concerns the emergence of communication. We could extend the model by adding signaling behaviors to the agents and test them in experimental setups similar to the seminal sender-receiver games proposed by Lewis 1 , or following a more robot centered approach such as Luc Steels 48, 49 . With the addition of a Contextual layer as proposed above, we could study the emergence of complex communicative systems embedding a proto-syntax, as outlined in 43, 50 .
Finally, this work aims to help in the advance towards the development of a functional embodied-AI that is able to survive in a complex multi-agent world, as outlined in 51 . For this purpose, we could extend this model to study not only other aspects of cooperation, like the wolfpack hunting behavior of 52, 53 but also of competing agent populations (e.g..
predator-prey). In ongoing work, we are developing a setup in which the simulated cognitive agents presented in this work will have to compete for limited resources in a massively multi-agent environment. This setup will also allow us to test the hypothesis proposed in [54] [55] [56] about the role of consciousness as a game-theoretic evolutionary strategy that could emerge out of a coevolutionary process triggered by a cognitive arms-race between goal-oriented agents.
